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Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, 11: 
Strategic Complenlentarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization 
Abstract: 
This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time- 
dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models (Fischer [19], Taylor 
[32]). It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized 
decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the 
equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present, 
whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions. By pursuing Tirole's [33] interpretation 
of a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of games with 'symmetric Stackelberg 
leadership', it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the 
benefit to the Stackelberg follolzler. provides the insight to the game-theoretic explanation of 
nonsynchronization. The results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and 
nonsynchronization - two iinportailt macroeconomic features. Journal of Economic Literature 
Classification Numbers: E30; L16 
Keywords: interdependence; strategic complementarity; endogenous nonsynchronization 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An important institutional feature appearing in a number of macroeconomic models (Fischer 
[19], Taylor [32], Blanchard [6]) is that wage or price decisions are made at different times. With 
nonsynchronous decisions, fully anticipated monetary policies can affect the real economy even when 
expectations are rational. Moreover, fixed level of individual prices for a short duration may generate 
gradual adjustment of aggregate price level in response to nominal disturbances and therefore lead to 
persistent real effects. The seminal papers in this field emphasize the real and long-lasting effects of 
short-run disturbances under the hypothesis of rational expectations, and how institutional 
arrangements affecting the propagation mechanism of the economy. In these articles, the overlapping 
timing pattern is taken as an assumption, which is believed to be representative of certain stylized 
facts. 
Given the crucial importance of nonsynchronous decisions, recent papers have tried to provide 
the microfoundations. Endogenous timing pattern is derived when each agent is allowed a choice of 
contract renewal dates. To highlight the difference, the outcome which results from an overlapping 
timing pattern is often contrasted with that of its polar opposite - complete synchronization - in which 
all agents make decisions at the same time. Fethke and Policano [17, 181 extend the model in Fischer 
[19] and Gray [22] and obtain the equilibrium pattern of wage negotiation. In their papers, staggered 
contracts allow the transmission of employment effects across sectors. On the other hand, Ball and 
Cecchetti [2] and Ball and Romer [4] examine price setting behavior in variants of the Blanchard- 
Kiyotaki model (Blanchard [6], Blanchard and Kiyotaki [8]). The former paper suggests that 
information extraction is the reason for nonsynchronization, while the latter emphasizes rapid 
adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks. 
A common characteristic of these papers is that the choices of individual agents, in terms of 
the contract renewal dates and the price (or wage) levels, will affect the payoffs of other agents in the 
economy. The presence of interdependence is a necessary condition for the pattern of price changes 
to be a relevant issue. In the absence of interdependence, an economic agent will not care about other 
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agents' prices and the time of making such changes. Since the presence of interdependence among 
economic agents is common and is likely to be recognized by them, it is natural to investigate what 
will result when they take this factor into account and interact strategically. In a sense, this is what 
the above-mentioned microfoundation papers do. However, in these papers, strategic interaction 
among the agents only appears in the choice of contract renewal dates, but not in the choice of prices 
or wages, even though an agent's payoff depends on the choice variables of other agents. A 
distinctive feature of this paper and Lau [26] is that strategic interaction among the agents appears in 
both aspects. The basic idea is that the nature of the game may differ with respect to the timing 
pattern, as is found in the dynamic analysis of market structure by Maskin and Tirole [27, 28, 291; 
see also the discussion in Blanchard and Fischer [7, p. 4011. 
Lau [26] studies two aspects of the labor market institutions (staggered versus synchronized 
wage setting, and coordinated versus noncooperative wage adjustment) in a model with strategic 
complementarity and negative externality. In particular, it is shown that wage setters prefer moving 
alternatingly when they interact noncooperatively. That paper mainly focuses on the relative ability 
of synchronization and nonsynchronization in overcoming macroeconomic externalities of wage 
adjustment, and does not consider whether and how the Pareto superior pattern will arise as the 
equilibrium outcome. This paper goes a step further by deriving formally that nonsynchronization 
is the equilibrium timing pattern in a dynamic model with strategic complementarity and positive 
externality, whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions .' Strategic complementarity 
may arise from the production technology, the trading technology, or agents' demands in many 
macroeconomic models; see Cooper and John [12]. A question that arises naturally in the presence 
of strategic complementarity is whether the Pareto superior timing pattern of nonsynchronization (for 
a particular model) will arise as the equilibrium outcome, especially if the initial pattern is 
'Following the terminology in macroeconomics (see Blanchard and Fischer [7, p. 3891, Romer [31, p. 
257]), price (or wage) adjustment in a multi-period contract is known as 'predetermined' if the price in each 
period of the contract may be different (as in Fischer [19]), but the adjustment is known as 'fixed' if the price 
is constant throughout the contract (as in Taylor [32]). 
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synchronization. The analysis in Cooper and John [12] suggests that when strategic complementarity 
is present, an inefficient equilibrium may perpetuate because no individual has an incentive to deviate 
from this equilibrium. The possibility of coordination failure may therefore prevent a Pareto superior 
outcome to be realized. The analysis of this paper suggests a simple way to solve the coordination 
problem in reaching the Pareto superior pattern of nonsynchronized moves, and as a result, 
nonsynchronization will emerge as the equilibrium outcome. 
The intuition underlying the above result is that in a model with strategic complementarity 
and positive externality such as a differentiated-product price competition game, each player has an 
incentive to set a lower price to undercut his opponent when they move simultaneously, yet the effect 
of this action is offset by similar behavior of his opponent at the equilibrium. As a result, both 
players earn lower payoffs at the simultaneous-move equilibrium when compared to moving 
sequentially. With nonsynchronized moves, a player needs not worry about his action being undercut 
and can set a higher price. Moreover, such action induces his opponent to do so (because of strategic 
complementarity) in the future. As positive externality is present, both players benefit from the 
higher prices. The first part of this paper applies this idea and shows formally that 
nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome, whether predetermined or fixed prices are chosen. 
As there are some interesting differences between the two games with predetermined and fixed prices 
respectively, the precise implementation of the above idea in each game will be discussed in more 
details after the equilibrium is derived. 
Generalizing from the analysis of the specific differentiated-product price competition model, 
this paper then aims to understand the factors leading to the equilibrium timing pattern under strategic 
and dynamic interaction. This question is motivated by the different endogenous timing patterns 
found in various games in Maskin and Tirole [27, 28, 291, De Fraja [14], Lau [26] and this paper. 
Based on the interpretation of a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of games with 
'symmetric Stackelberg leadership' (Tirole [33, p. 343]), this paper extends the insight of the analysis 
of a Stackelberg game and suggests that the equilibrium timing pattern can be traced to two aspects 
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of the players' payoff functions: the slope of the reaction function (i.e., strategic complementarity 
versus substitutability) and the sign of the externality effect. The importance of these two factors in 
determining different interesting phenomena has been first mentioned by Fudenberg and Tirole [20] 
and Bulow et al. [lo]. The analysis of this paper enriches the applicability of these taxonomies to 
the determination of the aggregate pattern of time-dependent adjustment rules. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple dynamic model exhibiting 
strategic complementarity and positive externality, with each player choosing repeatedly both the 
commitment length and the level(s) of the strategic variable. In Section 3, the aggregate timing 
pattern is derived endogenously when the players choose predetermined actions. Section 4 analyzes 
the game with fixed actions. Section 5 then examines the relationship between strategic 
complementarity and the benefit to the follower in a Stackelberg game, and suggests that the 
relationship provides the insight for the explanation of nonsynchronization in repeated interaction. 
Section 6 provides discussion and extension. Section 7 concludes. 
2. A SIMPLE DYNAMIC MODEL WITH STRATEGIC COMPLENIENTARITY AND 
POSITIVE EXTERNALITY 
This section introduces an infinite-horizon game which models jointly the players' decisions 
of the strategic variables and the commitment length. As the title of this paper suggests, only time- 
dependent adjustment rules are considered in this paper.* However, the assumption that a player 
adjusts on a regular schedule of, say, every two periods (as in many papers with time-dependent 
adjustment) is relaxed in order to allow the aggregate timing pattern to be derived endogenously. 
Specifically, the action of any player is assumed to last for one or two periods. 
2Most wage adjustment are characterized as time-dependent, and the majority of price adjustment may well 
be described as state-dependent. Blanchard and Fischer [7, p. 4131 discuss these two major types of adjustment 
rules and suggest some possible factors leading to each type. Interestingly, Ball and Mankiw [3] develop a 
model including time-dependent and state-dependent pricing to provide an explanation for asymmetric adjustment 
of nominal prices. Note that the aggregate pattern of state-dependent adjustment rules is not analyzed in this 
paper since a different approach (as in Caplin and Leahy [l l])  is required. 
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There are two identical players (A and B) in the game and they make a sequence of decisions. 
Each decision of a player consists of two dimensions: a commitment length of either one or two 
periods and the level(s) of the strategic variable. If the commitment length is two periods, the actions 
in the two periods are assumed to be predetermined in Section 3, but are assumed to be fixed in 
Section 4. The game begins (at period zero) with both players making their initial choices 
simultaneously, so as to maintain complete symmetry. The above formulation allows either 
synchronization or nonsynchronization to arise as possible eventual equilibrium outcome. Such a 
flexible specification (of allowing the two-dimensional choices to be made repeatedly) may appear, 
at first glance, to be quite intractable, but the recursive nature of the problem makes the solution 
possible. 
When making a new decision, say at period t ( t  r 0), player i (i = A,B) maximizes his 
intertemporal payoff (which is the present discounted value of the stream of his current and future 
single-period payoffs): 
where i , j  = A ,  B (i tt j) ,  0 E (0,l)  is the discount factor and xk, is the choice of player i at period t+s. 
To simplify notation, the subscript referring to the time period may sometimes be omitted if it does 
not cause confusion. The strategic variable x i  is assumed to lie in a compact action space [E, a .  The 
single-period payoff function U '(. , .) is twice continuously differentiable with U; < 0 ,  where the 
subscripts on U i  denote partial derivatives (e.g. ~ j '  r aUilaxi, V; E a2Uilaxi axj). As will be 
elaborated in Section 5, the equilibrium pattern of time-dependent adjustment rules depends crucially 
on the presence of positive versus negative externality, and strategic complementarity versus 
substitutability. The externality effect refers to the interaction of the players at the level of payoffs, 
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and strategic complementarity or substitutability refers to their interaction at the level of ~ t r a t eg i e s .~  
Many interesting macroecoilon~ic models satisfy either (a) strategic complementarity and positive 
e ~ t e r n a l i t y , ~  or (b) strategic complementarity and negative e ~ t e r n a l i t y . ~  
For the analysis in Sections 3 and 4, the single-period payoff function is assumed to be: 
~ ' (x , ' ,  x i )  = x,'(h - x,' + gx / ) ,  (2.2) 
where g (0 < g < 1) and h (h > 0) are constants. It is clear that U; =g and u,' =gx '. As a resuIt, 
strategic complementarity and positive externality are present when b, is in the positive interval. 
The payoff function (2.2) may be interpreted as a player's profit in a differentiated-product price 
competition model.6 When the demand of product i (i=A,B) is given by the bracketed term in the 
3Positive (resp. negative) externality exists if an increase in a player's strategic variable leads to an increase 
(resp. decrease) in his opponent's total payoff, i.e., Uj' > 0 (resp. < 0 ) .  Strategic complementarity (resp. 
substitutability) exists if an increase in a player's strategic variable leads to an increase (resp. decrease) in his 
opponent's marginal payoff, i.e., U; > 0 (resp. < 0);  Eq. (5.2) makes clear that this condition is equivalent 
to a positive (resp. negative) dependence of a player's optimal strategy upon his opponent's. 
4Strategic complementarity and positive externality are present in the trading externalities model of Diamond 
[15] and the production externalities model of Bryant [9]. In the Diamond [15] model, risk-neutral individuals 
face production decisions that arrive stochastically and have varying costs. To represent the advantage of 
specialized production and trade over self-sufficiency, it is assumed that individuals cannot consume their own 
products but trade their own output for that produced by others. Having made a decision to produce, agents 
then seek trading partners and consume the good so obtained. Utility depends negatively upon the cost of 
production and positively upon consumption. The payoff of a player is defined as the expected utility prior to 
the arrival of the production opportunity, and the strategic variable is the ex ante choice of a cutoff cost of 
production below which the individual will choose to produce. As more individuals produce, the expected 
payoff to an agent from producing will increase (i.e., positive externality) under the assumption that an increase 
in the number of potential trading partners makes trade easier. As more production opportunities are expected 
to be profitable, so an agent will increase his cutoff cost of production (i.e., strategic complementarity). 
3trategic complementarity and negative externality are present in the economic environment examined in 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki [8] and Lau [26]. In the household-firm version of the Blanchard and Kiyotaki [8] 
model, each of the monopolistically competitive firms set its price to maximize profit. A negative aggregate 
demand externality is present: a firm's profit will decrease with an increase in the prices of all other firms since 
the increase in prices will decrease the real money balances and thus aggregate demand. Also, strategic 
complementarity exists when the relative price effect dominates the aggregate demand effect; see Figure 3 and 
p. 659 of that paper. 
60ne may interpret that the two firms compete in prices by mailing price catalogs effective for one or two 
periods. However, it should be emphasized that this price setting game is used mainly to illustrate the two 
features of strategic complementarity and positive externality, and by no means implies that time-dependent price 
adjustment rules are necessarily more empirically relevant than state-dependent rules. The empirical evidence 
in Kashyap [23] suggests that either simple time-dependent rules or state-dependent rules capture some but not 
all of the essential aspects of catalog price setting. Alternatively, one may interpret the model as a real wage 
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right-hand side of (2.2) where x '  represents price of good i, then with (normalized) zero production 
cost, the profit of firm i is given by (2.2). Parameter h (h > 0) is the demand intercept, and parameter 
g represents the degree of substitutability between the two goods (with the restriction 0 < g  < 1 
capturing that they are imperfect substitutes). When price of product A increases, its demand is 
reduced but that for product B is increased, resulting in higher profit of firm B (i.e., positive 
externality). Moreover, an increase in the price of good A will raise the marginal profit of firm B 
and therefore, firm B's optimal price will increase (i.e., strategic ~omplementarity).~ 
For convenience in exposition, the above game will be referred to as the timing-and-price 
game, even though it is also applicable to other models exhibiting strategic complementarity and 
positive externality (such as the wage setting game mentioned in footnote 6). Moreover, the action 
space [?,q is taken to be [x,,x,] where 0 <xN <x,, xN is defined in (2.5) below, and 
x, = h l[2(1 -g)] , which is the 'cooperative' choice of each player if they jointly maximize their 
single-period payoffs. As symmetric single-period payoffs appear several times in this paper, it is 
useful to define: 
Urr = Ui(xr,xr) = hxr - (1 - g ) ~ f .  (2.3) 
It is helpful to illustrate the fundamental strategic conflicts facing the two players in a static 
setting and to define some terms which will be useful later, before considering the outcome when the 
agents interact dynamically. First, the optimal static reaction function of player i (i=A,B) conditional 
on the choice xi of the other player, R,(xi), is defined implicitly by: 
setting game. In each of the two sectors, the (real) wage is assumed to be chosen by the employees or the union 
representing them (in the spirit of the monopoly union model). The employer then chooses the employment 
level, taking the wage as given. In this case, the single-period payoff in (2.2) is the wage bill of a particular 
sector. 
'To paraphrase Bulow et al. [lo, p. 5101, "if an oligopoly model assumes, say, linear demand and 
differentiated-product price competition, the real economic assumption may be that the products are sfr~tegic 
complements. " 
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Moreover, each player's choice at the Nash equilibrium of this static non-cooperative game, 
x A  = x B  = x N ,  is given by:8 
and the corresponding single-period payoff is: 
3. EQUILIBRIlLrM TIMING PATTERN WITH PREDETERMINED PRICES 
This section analyzes the timing-and-price game with predetermined prices. If a player 
commits for two periods, the prices for both periods may be different. To derive the equilibrium, 
it is helpful to perform a sequence of analysis such that the players assume that some conditions are 
(and will be) satisfied now (and in the future) for each problem. After the various simpler problems 
are analyzed, the validity of these conditions is verified along the equilibrium path. Specifically, Sub- 
section 3.1 obtains the players' equilibrium strategies and the corresponding payoffs if both players 
are and will be forever committing for two periods and moving alternatingly. Sub-section 3.2 derives 
a crucial condition such that no player will deviate from the current timing pattern of 
nonsynchronization (with both players making commitments for two periods) by committing to a 
particular action for one period when this condition holds. This condition is called the no-deviation- 
from-nonsynchronization (NDFN) condition. On the assumption that the NDFN condition holds, Sub- 
section 3.3 shows that there are two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria. Sub-section 3.4 derives a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium to solve the coordination problem in reaching nonsynchronization, and 
verifies that the NDFN condition is indeed satisfied, after the value of the game (to be defined 
precisely later) is determined along the time path corresponding to the mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
'For the single-period payoff function ( 2 . 2 ) ,  it is easy to show that R,(xi)  = ( h  + g x i ) / 2 .  It follows that: 
(a) the corresponding maximum single-period payoff of player i is given by u ' [ ~ , ( x j ) , x j )  = ( h  +gxj)' / 4 ;  and 
(b) solving the optimal static reaction functions of both players simultaneously gives ( 2 . 5 ) .  
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Sub-section 3.5 briefly summarizes the equilibrium outcome of the game and discusses the intuition. 
3.1. Equilibriurn strategies and payoffs if the players move alternatingly forever 
In this sub-section, it is assumed that after a particular time period, all commitments made 
by both players last for two periods and that the players move alternatingly. Without loss of 
generality, it is also assumed that player A (resp. B) chooses his two prices (one for the current 
period and the other for the next) at every even (resp. odd) period. Therefore, both x l  and x i , ,  are 
chosen at period 2k ,  and both x i - ,  and x l  are chosen at period 2k-1. 
It can easily be seen that at, say, an even period when player A moves, the action of player 
B for the current period has been chosen (in the previous period), and this action of player B affects 
player A's current-period payoff. Therefore, player A acts as a Stackelberg follower (temporarily) 
in an even period, with his opponent as the Stackelberg leader. Besides setting a price for the current 
period, player A also chooses another price for the next period, knowing that his opponent's choice 
will be made in the next period. The roles of the two players are just reversed in an odd period. 
The sequential nature of the players' moves together with the assumption of predetermined 
(but not necessarily constant) prices means that the equilibrium of this game can be solved period by 
period. The subgame perfect equilibrium at a particular period with player j (i =B when t=2k, or 
j=A when t=2k+l )  as the leader and player i (i=A when t=2k, or i=B when t=2k+ l )  as the 
follower, is derived as follows. Taking the action of leader j as given, follower i chooses x i  to 
maximize (2.2). The optimal reaction function of follower i, Ri (x j ) ,  is defined in (2.4). Anticipating 
the future action of follower i ,  leader j chooses x i  to maximize: 
where U;(XJ) may be interpreted as the 'reduced-form' single-period payoff function of leader j. 
With the single-period payoff function (2.2), it can be shown that the optimal choice of leader 
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j is given by xJ = xL where 
Combining (2.2), (2.4) and (3.2), the optimal choice of follower i is given by x i  = x, where 
As a result, the single-period payoff of leader j and that of follower i are given by: 
Combining (2.6), (3.4) and (3.5), it can be shown that 
UNN < UL < UF. (3.6) 
(All detailed derivations are contained in an Appendix available from the author upon request.) 
For subsequent analysis, it is helpful to define two value functions for each player, with one 
function at the period when he moves and the other when his opponent moves. The value functionVi(xj) 
(resp. Wi(x ')), i , j  = A ,  B and i # j, is defined as player i's intertemporal payoff at the beginning of a 
period in which he (resp. his opponent) moves, with the expectation that whenever each player moves 
in the future, the player will commit for two periods and choose Ri(xj) and xL in the first and second 
periods respectively. Note that the variable xi in Vi(xJ) or the variable x i  in Wi(xi) has already been 
set in the previous period. According to the results of dynamic programming, the optimal choices 
and the value functions are inutually consistent in the following manner: 
max 
vi(xi) = x i ,  x+ ,  ; [ui (xi ,x j )  + p w i ( x i , ) ]  = U [ ( R ~ ( X ~ )  , X J ) + P  wi (xL) ,  
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3.2. The no-deviation-from-nonsynchronization condition 
This sub-section considers the most important step in solving the timing-and-price game. It 
aims to obtain the condition such that if the opponent's commitment lasts for one more period when 
a player is making a move, the player will always commit for two periods. This condition is crucial 
because if the condition holds for an arbitrary level in the action space, then no player will ever find 
it beneficial to deviate by committing for only one period. As a result, if the nonsynchronization 
pattern is reached at some point of time, then it will last forever. 
At the time when a player (labelled as player i) moves, suppose that the price of his opponent 
(player j) for the current period has been set previously at xj .  If player i only commits for one 
period, then it is easy to see that starting from the next period, the whole game starts again with both 
players moving simultaneously. It is obvious that player i's optimal choice for the current period is 
given by R,(xj). As a result, player i's intertemporal payoffs is given by: 
max 
x i  [u i (x i ,x?  + ~ v ]  = u i ( ~ , ( x j )  , x ~ + o v ,  
where V is the value of the timing-and-price game with predetermined prices, defined as the 
(expected) value of each player's intertemporal payoff at the beginning of the game. Note that the 
players' payoff fuilctions and the assumptions on timing decisions are completely symmetric; thus, V 
is the same for both players. On the other hand, if player i commits for two periods, then the two 
prices will be set at R,(xJ) and x, respectively, and his intertemporal payoff will be given by Vi(x*) 
of (3.7), with the expectation that neither player will deviate from choosing prices for two periods 
according to (3.3) and (3.2) in the future. 
Combining the above results, if the current timing pattern is nonsynchronization and the 
opponent's current price is X J ,  then this pattern will last forever when the following NDFN 
expression: 
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is positive (i.e., the NDFN condition is satisfied). As the NDFN expression depends on the value 
of the game, whether this expression is positive or not can only be verified after the equilibrium of 
the game is obtained. This will be done in later sub-sections. 
3.3. Pure-strategy equilibria 
At the beginning (period 0) of the game, both players choose the initial commitment length 
and the price(s) simultaneously, knowing that each of the players will again make such two- 
dimensional decision whenever the commitment expires. Consider first the optimal reaction function 
of player i if player j commits only for one period and sets price xi at period 0. It can be observed 
that player i's two-din~ensional (length of the current commitment and the price(s)) problem here is 
exactly the same as the one associated with the NDFN condition. As a result, provided that the 
NDFN expression (3.10) is positive, player ips optimal response to player j's action of xd at period 
zero is to commit for two periods with prices at R,(X;) and x, respe~tively.~ 
Next, consider the optimal reaction function of player i if player j chooses, at period 0,  a two- 
period commitment with price x,/ for period 0 and price x:' for period 1. If player i commits for two 
periods, then by similar arguments as before, player i's optimal choices of the prices are given by 
R,(x;) and R,(x/) respectively. As a result, his intertemporal payoff is: 
max 
i[ui(x;,x,') + p ui(x/,x:) + pv] = ui(~,(X;),  xi) + p ui (~ , (x : ) ,  x;) + pv. (3.11) 
xo , XI  
If player i convnits for one period, then he will face a nonsynchronized timing pattern (with player 
j's commitment not yet expired) in the next period when he moves again. On the anticipation that 
nonsynchronization will last forever, his intertemporal payoff starting from period 1 is given by 
9A brief discussion is as follows. If  player i commits for one period, then by arguments leading to (3.9), 
player i's optimal response is Ri(x;) and his intertemporal payoff is given by (3.9). If player i commits for two 
periods, then (on the assumptioll that the NDFN condition holds) the two prices are chosen according to (3.7). 
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Vi(x:) . Therefore, player i's optimization problem at period zero is given by: 
max . . 
[ui(x;,x:) + a vi(x/)]  = u i ( ~ ~ ( x i )  , xi) + 6 VV~:) 
xo 
It is easy to conclude froni (3.1 1) and (3.12) that if the NDFN expression (3.10) is positive 
and player j chooses x; for period 0 and x{ for period 1, then player i's optimal response at period 
0 is to commit for one period and set his price at Ri(xi). An interesting observation from the above 
analysis is that because of the recursive nature of the problem, the NDFN condition (which guarantees 
no deviation froni nonsynchronization if the players move alternatingly in a particular period) is also 
important for the determination of a player's optimal reaction function in the beginning of the game 
when both players move simultaneously. 
Combining the above results, it can be shown that, if the NDFN condition is satisfied, there 
are two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria of this game: (( 1 , x,), ( 2 ,  x, ,x,)) and ( (2 ,  x, ,x,), (1 , x,)) , 
where ( 1 ,  x,) represents the commitment of one period and the corresponding period-0 price, and 
(2 ,  x,,x,) represents the coinrnitment of two periods and the corresponding period-0 and period-1 
prices. Moreover, if player i chooses ( 1 , x,) at period 0 and player j chooses (2 ,  x, , x,) , then player 
i7s intertemporal payoff is: 
and that of his opponent is: 
3.4. Mixed-strategy equilibrium and verification of the no-deviation-from-nonsynchronization condition 
It is shown above that there are two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria (provided that the 
NDFN condition is satisfied). In each equilibrium, one player commits for one period and the other 
commits for two periods at period 0. Moreover, it can be shown that V, > V,, which means that in 
each of these two equilibria, the player who commits for one period in the beginning will have a 
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higher payoff than the player committing for two periods.1° Given the complete symmetry of the 
game, there is a coordination problem. While both players prefer nonsynchronization eventually 
(provided that the NDFN co~lditio~l holds), each player also prefers choosing (1 , x N )  at the beginning 
while his opponent choosing ( 2 , x N , x L ) .  
There is a simple and intuitive mixed-strategy equilibrium to solve the coordination problem 
in reaching nonsynchronization. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player chooses ( l , x N )  with 
probability p and ( 2 , x N , x L )  with probability 1  - p .  It is easy to see from Table I that at the mixed- 
strategy equilibrium, the value of the game, V ,  is given by: 
where UL, is defined in (2.3) with xr = x L .  Obviously, there is an interdependence between p and V  
in the two equalities of (3.15). Con~bining these two equalities, it can be shown that only one root 
of p is between zero and one. Once p is determined, V  can be obtained as: 
The above analysis derives the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the timing-and-price game 
provided that the NDFN condition holds. Moreover, the value of the game is expressed in terms of 
the underlying parameters of the model. The next step is to verify that the NDFN condition is in fact 
satisfied for every period along the equilibrium time path. Combining (3.4), (3.8), (3.10) and (3.16), 
10Combining ( 3 . 4 ) ,  ( 3 . 3 ,  ( 3 . 7 )  and ( 3 . 8 ) ,  it can be shown that V i ( x L )  = U, + P W i ( x L )  and 
W i ( x L )  = UL + P V i ( x L )  . Solving these two equations simultaneously, one obtains: 
As U ,  > U L  according to ( 3 . 6 ) ,  it is easy to conclude that V i ( x L )  > W i ( x L )  . Combining this result with (3 .13)  
and ( 3 . 1 4 ) ,  V ,  > V, is concluded. The crucial aspect of the above proof is that U, > U,, i.e., the payoff of 
the follower is higher than that of the leader for the 'Stackelberg game' with payoff function ( 2 . 2 ) .  As a result 
of this 'second mover advantage' (Gal-Or [ 2 1 ] ) ,  each player prefers his opponent choosing ( 2 , x N , x L )  at period 
0 so that he can be the follower at period 1 ,  the earliest possible period. 
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it can be shown that 
NDFN = p[wi(xL) -v] = D { (  uL-uNN) +p/3[(1 -/3)vi(XL)- uL]} 
1 -pP 
is positive, as UL > UNN according to the first inequality of (3.6) and (1 -8)Vi(xL) > UL according to 
(3.7a) in footnote 10 and the second inequality of (3.6). 
3.5. Equilibrium outcome and the intuition 
From the analysis of the previous sub-sections, it can be concluded that in the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, each player chooses (l,xN) with probability p  and (2,xN,xL) with probability 1 - p  at the 
beginning of the game. If both players' choices turn out to be (1, x,) (resp. (2,xN ,xL)), then the game 
re-starts again at period 1. (resp. period 2) with both players repeating the previous mixed strategies. 
On the other hand, if it turns out that one player chooses (l,xN) and the other chooses (2,xN,xL), then 
the nonsynchronized timing pattern emerges. Moreover, once the nonsynchronized pattern emerges, 
it will last forever with each player committing for two periods and choosing the prices according to 
(3.3) and (3.2). This is because the NDFN expression (3.17) is positive for each time period. 
Nonsynchronization is the absorbing state of this infinite-horizon timing-and-price game. As a result, 
the timing pattern of the game will eventually go to nonsynchronization with probability one. 
The intuition of the above results is that in a differentiated-product price competition model, 
it is beneficial for the players to move sequentially rather than simultaneously, according to (3.6). 
With both players choosing predetermined prices, alternating moves ensure that each player acts as 
either a Stackelberg leader or a Stackelberg follower every period. Even though there is a 
coordination problem in reaching this outcome (as each player prefers choosing the one-period 
,,&la 
commitment at period 0 prd his opponent choosing the two-period commitment), this section shows 
CA.JT* 
that th-s problem can be solved. The crucial factor is that there is no incentive to deviate from 
nonsyncl~ronizatioi~ once it is reached. Knowing that the NDFN condition holds, each player chooses 
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a mixed strategy in the beginning of the game. With 'trial and error', the coordination problem is 
solved automatically and nonsynchronization will emerge eventually. 
Moving beyond the specific model of differentiated-product price competition, Section 5 will 
give a more general explanation in terms of the structural factors (the slope of the reaction function 
and the sign of the externality effect) and examine the importance of strategic complementarity in 
determining the equilibrium timing pattern. Before that, the equilibrium outcome of the timing-and- 
price game with fixed prices will be considered in the next section. 
4. EQUILIBRItM TIMING PATTERN WITH FIXED PRICES 
In the timing-and-price game with fixed prices, a player's price is constant throughout the 
cormnitment length, whether it is one or two periods. This specification of constant action (wage or 
price) throughout the commitment length has been used in Taylor [32] in the macroeconomics 
literature, and Cyert and DeGroot [13] and Maskin and Tirole [27, 28, 291 in the industrial 
organization literature. . There are interesting differences between this game and that with 
predetermined prices, and they will be discussed in Sub-section 6.1. On the other hand, some of the 
analysis in this section is similar to those in Section 3, and these aspects will only be discussed 
briefly. 
First of all, it is assumed that after a particular time period, each player commits his action 
for two periods and the players move alternatingly. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 
player A (resp. B) chooses the action at every even (resp. odd) period, which lasts for two periods. 
B B Therefore, x i , ,  = x i  and x, = x,,-, . This structure is the simplest form of an alternating-move game, 
which has been used in Cyert and DeGroot [13] who apply the finite-horizon version to understand 
Cournot competition, and in Maskin and Tirole [27, 28, 291 who use the infinite-horizon version to 
examine various kinds of oligopolistic competition. 
Each player is assumed to choose a Markov (or feedback) strategy, i.e., an action dependent 
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on payoff-relevant state variables only." If nonsynchronization lasts forever with each player 
choosing his action for two periods, then the opponent's most recent action is the only payoff-relevant 
variable. The restriction to Markov strategies leads to a search for dynamic reaction functions of the 
following form: 
x,' = ~~(x,!~ ,) , (4.1) 
where i = A (if t=2k) or B (if t = 2 k f  I) ,  i z j ,  and D,(.) and D,(.) are time-invariant functions. 
A Markov reaction function pair {D, (x-:), D,(x-:) ) constitutes a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) 
if the reaction function of player i (i=A,B) maximizes his intertemporal payoff given his opponent's 
reaction function. l 2  
The problem is solved by applying the game-theoretic analogue of dynamic programming. 
Define two value functions for each player, with one function at the period when he chooses his 
action and the other when his opponent makes decision. The value function ~'(x!,) (resp. ~ ' (x: , )) ,  i , j  =A,  B 
and i z j ,  is defined as player i's interteinporal payoff at the beginning of a period in which he (resp. 
his opponent) moves, given that xi, (resp. x!, ) has been chosen by his opponent (resp. him) in the 
last period and with the expectation that the optimal dynamic reaction functions {D , ,D , )  will be 
chosen forever subsequently. 
According to the results of dynamic programming, the reaction function pair {D,, D,)  forms 
"By restricting to Markov strategies, a player reacts only to the opponent's current action (such as a price 
cut) and not to earlier history or to one's own past actions. This specification seems "to accord better with the 
customary conception of a reaction in the informal industrial organization literature than do, say, the reactions 
emphasized in the repeated game tradition" (Maskin and Tirole [28, p. 5531). Moreover, it can be shown that 
the Markov reaction functions in this section (as well as (3.2) and (3.3) in Section 3) are optimal in the 
corresponding finite-horizon model. Thus the equilibrium is not sensitive to whether the horizon is infinite or 
arbitrarily long but finite. These advantages (over the repeated game approach) make it particularly appropriate 
to examine the roles of synchronization versus nonsynchronization in solving the strategic conflicts. On the 
other hand, if the repeated game approach is used, then its well-known problems (such as large number of 
equilibria and non-robustness) are also present in the timing-and-price games of this paper. 
"A player has no incentive to choose non-Markov strategies if his opponent's strategies are Markov (Maskin 
and Tirole [28, Propositioil 11). Note also that the terminology of MPE follows the various papers of Maskin 
and Tirole, whereas Kydland [24] and Basar and Olsder [5] use the term 'feedback Nash equilibrium' for the 
same concept. 
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a MPE if and only if there exists value functions { ( V A ,  WA) ,  ( V B ,  W E ) )  such that the reaction functions 
and the value functions are mutually consistent in the following manner: 
max 
vi(x!,) = x i  [ui(xi,x!,) + p w i ( x i ) ]  = u'(D,(x!,) , x!,) + g wi(Di(x!,)), (4.2) 
With single-period payoff function (2.2), the equilibrium dynamic reaction functions are given by: 
where i = A (if t=2k) or B (if t=2k+ 1), and b (0 < b < 1) satisfies 
P2gb4 + 2Pgb2 - 2(1 +P)b + g = 0. 
Moreover, it can be shown that13 
It is easy to show that the price set by each player at the steady state, x,,, is given by: 
Moreover, it can be shown from (4.4) and (4.7) that 
D,(xj) -xi = (1 -b)(xnAG-xj), (4.8) 
which implies that whenever a price is less than x,,, the price in the next period (set by the other 
player) is higher than the current price provided that nonsynchronization continues. As a result, the 
sequence of prices (set by the two players alternatingly) is monotonically increasing over time to 
approach the steady state value. 
The next step is to obtain the NDFN condition. At the time when player i moves, suppose 
I3For completeness, the other value function of player i is given by: 
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that his opponent's price has been set at x i  and it will last until the end of the current period. If 
player i commits for one period, then it is easy to see that his intertemporal payoff is the same as 
(3.9), where V is now the value of the timing-and-price game with fixed prices.I4 On the other 
hand, if player i commits for two periods, then his price is set optimally at D, (xJ )  and his 
intertemporal payoff is given by V i ( x J )  of (4.2), with the expectation that in the future neither player 
will deviate from committing for two periods and choosing (4.4). Thus, if the current timing pattern 
is nonsynchronization and the opponent's current price is x i ,  then this timing pattern will continue 
if a positive value appears in the following NDFN expression: 
At the beginning (period 0) of the game, both players make their choices (commitment length 
and price) simultaneously, knowing that such two-dimensional decision will again be made whenever 
the current commitment expires. For ease of notation, the choice of player j can be represented by(1 ,x,/)  
or ( 2 , ~ ; )  where the first and second arguments represent respectively player j's commitment length 
and price at period 0. Following similar analysis as in Section 3, it can be shown that if the NDFN 
expression (4.9) is positive, then (a) player i's optimal response to player j's choice of ( 1 , ~ ; )  is to 
choose (2,~Jx:)); and (b) player i's optimal response to player j's choice of ( 2 , ~ ; )  is to choose 
( 1  R ) ) .  With the single-period payoff function (2.2), solving these two optimal timing-and-price 
reaction functions si~nultaneously gives two symmetric pure-strategy equilibria of this game as 
I4To econonlize on the use of notario~~ and ko facililate comparison, some of the symbols (such as V, V,, V, 
and p) in this section are the same as those in Sectioil 3, even though they refer to different games. 
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( ( 1  , x , ) ,  ( 2 , ~ ~ ) )  and ( ( 2 , x 2 ) ,  ( 1  , x , ) ) , ' ~  where 
Moreover, if player i chooses (1 , x , )  at period 0 and player j chooses (2 ,  x , ) ,  then player i's 
intertemporal payoff is given by V, and that of his opponent is given by V , ,  where 
V ,  = Ui(R ,  ( x 2 )  , x 2 )  + P V i ( x 2 ) ,  ( 4 . 1 2 )  
V2  = V j ( x , ) .  ( 4 . 1 3 )  
There is also a coordination problem at the beginning of the timing-and-price game for fixed 
prices because V ,  > V , .  As in the previous game, the coordination problem can be solved if both 
players choose mixed strategies. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player chooses ( l , x , )  with 
probability p and ( 2 , x , )  with probability 1 - p .  It can be deduced from Table I1 that at the mixed- 
strategy equilibrium, p is defined by the following quadratic equation: 
where U , ,  and U,, are defined in ( 2 . 3 )  with x, = x ,  and x, = x, respectively. It can be shown that only 
one root of p in ( 4 . 1 4 )  is between zero and one. Once p is determined, V is obtained as: 
The last step is to verify that the NDFN condition is satisfied for every period along the 
equilibrium time path, and there are two main ingredients in the proof. First, it can be shown from 
I5Note that x ,  and x, are related by x ,  = R,(x,)  and x, = D , ( x , ) ,  and the subscript in x ,  or x, does not 
represent the time period. Moreover, i t  is necessary to verify (later) that the NDFN condition holds for x,  in 
order to show that (( 1 , x,), ( 1 , x,)) and ( ( 2 ,  x,), ( 2 ,  x,,,)) are not equilibria of this game. 
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(2.5), (4.7), (4.10) and (4.11) that 
x~ < < x2 < x s m ~  . (4.16) 
Combining (4.8) and (4.16), it can be concluded that the prices chosen by both players at different 
time periods will always lie between .r, and x,, . The second ingredient in showing the satisfaction 
of the NDFN condition makes use of the functional form of (4.9). The NDFN expression (4.9) is 
a quadratic function in x i  with an ever-decreasing slope (i.e. a negative second derivative).16 As 
it can further be shown that the interval [x,, xmJ lies on the increasing branch of the convex curve, 
the NDFN expression is increasing in this interval.17 
Combining the above two ingredients, it is sufficient to just check whether the NDFN 
condition is satisfied at x,. While it is difficult to obtain a closed-form expression due to the 
complicated relationships of the various parameters in (4.9), (4.14) and (4.15), an extensive 
computational check suggests that for h > 0 ,  
is positive for all parameter combinations of 0 < 0 < 1 and 0 < g < 1 . (The computation includes 9801 
cases, with each of and g  running from 0.01 to 0.99 with an increment of 0.01, as well as other 
cases with either parameter very close to zero or one.) The NDFN condition is satisfied at all time 
periods. Some calculated values of (4.17) are given in Table 111. An interesting observation is that 
while the NDFN expression is increasing in the discount factor 0, it is always positive for 0 < 0 < 1 .  
The players will not deviate from the Pareto superior equilibrium of nonsynchronization for all 
I6It can be shown that the stable root of ( 4 . 5 )  lies between 0 and g l 2 .  As a result, 2b-g < 0 
''Note that it is necessary to check whether the NDFN condition holds at x, or not (see footnote 15) ,  even 
though ( 4 . 8 )  and ( 4 . 1 6 )  imply that the price set by either player is always at least as high as x ,  (which is greater 
than x,) at the equilibrium path (if the NDFN condition holds). 
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possible values of the discount factor between 0 and 1 . I 8  
To conclude, both players choose mixed strategies at the beginning of the game. Since the 
NDFN expression (4.9) is positive for each time period, nonsynchronization is the absorbing state of 
this timing-and-price game with fixed prices, and it will eventually emerge. 
With the players choosiilg fixed prices, nonsynchronized moves ensure that whenever a player 
moves, the price of the other player remains unchanged temporarily. The player choosing his current 
price needs not worry about his action being undercut by his opponent. Therefore, it is optimal for 
him to set a higher price (in order to maximize his intertemporal payoff, on the anticipation that (4.4) 
will be chosen in the futuie). Furthermore, such action induces the other player to follow suit in the 
future when she sets her price, according to (4.8) and (4.16). As a result, the prices increase 
monotonically over time, and both players benefit. As in the game in Section 3, the satisfaction of 
the NDFN condition means that the coordination problem in reaching nonsynchronization can be 
solved automatically when the players choose mixed strategies at the beginning. 
5. UNDERSTANDING THJ3 ROLE OF STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY FOR 
ENDOGENOUS NONSYNCHRONIZATION 
The analysis in previous sections shows that in the presence of strategic complementarity and 
positive externality, nonsynchronization emerges as the equilibrium timing pattern, whether 
predetermined or fixed prices are chosen by the players. This section attempts to provide a more 
general explanation to the above results by interpreting a synchronized-move dynamic game as a 
series of short-term simuitaneous-move games, and a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series 
of Stackelberg games in which each player is taking the roles of Stackelberg leader and follower 
''This result differs froin the typical result of the repeated game literature (in which actions contingent on 
payoff-irrelevant history are commonly used) that the Pareto superior equilibrium can be sustained only when 
the discount factor is close to 1. 
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alternatingly and syrnnletrically.19 Therefore, the payoff of a player under synchronization is the 
present discounted value of the stream of payoffs for the series of simultaneous-move games, whereas 
his payoff under nonsynchronization depends on the payoff of a leader and that of a follower for the 
corresponding Stackelberg games. It is well-known that the Stackelberg leader's payoff is higher than 
or equal to that in the simultaneous-move game since the leader can always achieve the Nash payoff 
in the Stackelberg game, if he wishes. On the other hand, the analysis of the Stackelberg follower's 
payoff is more interesting and relevant regarding the aggregate pattern of time-dependent adjustment 
rules. This is examined in Sub-section 5.1. The relevance of these results for the equilibrium timing 
pattern in repeated interaction is examined in Sub-section 5.2. Note that the analysis of this section 
is conducted for a general payoff function Ui (x ' , x j )  with uij < 0, and is therefore not only applicable 
to the specific payoff function (2.2) used in previous sections. 
5.1. Effect of the Stackelberg leader's action on the follower 
To examine the effect of the Stackelberg leader's action on the follower, compare the Nash 
equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game and the subgame perfect equilibrium of a Stackelberg game 
with the same payoff functions for the players.20 The Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move 
game, x A  = x B  = xN, is obtained by solving simultaneously the two reaction functions defined 
implicitly in (2.4), where i = A and B (and j z i) respectively. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium for the Stackelberg game with player j (where j may be A 
or B) as the leader is derived as follows. Taking the choice of leader j as given, follower i chooses 
19Tirole [33, p. 3431 has suggested this interpretation of an alternating-move game in discussing issues about 
strategic overinvestment. See also Maskin and Tirole [27, p. 9561. 
'('Note that this paper does not focus on the comparison of the payoffs of the Stackelberg leader and follower 
(as done in Gal-Or [21] or Dowrick [16]), even though there are similar structural factors for this question and 
the one in this sub-section. In the comparison of synchronized versus nonsynchronized patterns, it does not 
matter whether the payoff of the Stackelberg leader or that of the follower is higher. What is important is how 
the payoff of either player in a Stackelberg game compared with the equilibrium payoff of the corresponding 
simultaneous-move game. 
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her strategic variable to maximize her payoff. The optimal reaction function of follower i, R i ( x j ) ,  
is defined implicitly in (2.4). Anticipating the action of follower i, leader j chooses his action to 
maximize (3.1). 
The next step is to examine whether follower i obtains a higher payoff in the simultaneous- 
move game or in the Stackelberg game. Differentiating (3.1) with respect to xJ gives: 
where 
which is obtained by differentiating (2.4) with respect to x j .  The sign of R ; ( x ~ )  is the same as that 
of U; since U; < 0 is assumed. When leader j changes his choice, this action has direct and strategic 
effects on his own payoff through the first and second terms of the right-hand side of (5.1). At the 
Nash equilibrium level x,, there is no direct effect (to the first order) on his payoff. On the other 
hand, because of interdependence, his action affects follower i's choice and thus his own payoff 
indirectly. 
Similarly, define the 'reduced-form' payoff function of follower i as: 
Differentiating (5.3) with respect to xJ gives: 
d U&(X I )  
= U,'(RLX J), XJ) R: (xi) + qi(Ri(xj), x ]  = LI,'(R,(XJ). XI), 
dx' 
where the second equality holds as follower i reacts optimally to any choice of x i  according to 
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(2.4).2' 
To see how a change of the strategic variable of leader j, from the initial level at the Nash 
equilibrium, would affect the payoff of follower i, one can write the change in the payoff of follower 
i as a product of the change in xJ and the derivative of the payoff of follower i with respect to xJ. 
Therefore, the sign of the change in follower i's payoff is given by: 
sign (A U') = sign (AxJ) sign d uiF(xN) d uL(xN) d u&(xN) [ dxj ] =sign [ ] sign [ dx, 1 7 (5.5) 
where the second equality arises because leader j will increase xJ if the derivative of his reduced-form 
payoff function (3.1) is positive and vice versa. 
Substituting (5.1) and (5.4), both evaluated at the Nash equilibrium (such that the first term 
in the right-hand side of (5.1) drops), into (5.5) gives: 
sign (A U )  =  sign(^' (xN)) sign(u/(xN,xN)) sign(~'(xN,xN)) . 
Under the symmetry assumption, Ul(xN,xN) and uj'(xN,xN) have the same sign and therefore the two 
externality effects 'cancel' out (in sign). It can then be concluded from (5.6) that whether the 
follower's payoff increases or decreases is solely related to whether strategic complementarity or 
substitutability is present. Follower i will benefit in the presence of strategic complementarity and 
vice versa. The above results are represented in the two-by-two classification according to the sign 
of the externality effect and that of the slope of the optimal reaction function in Table IV. 
For the price coinpetition model in previous sections which exhibits strategic complementarity 
and positive externality, leader j knows that his profit will be increased if follower i's price is raised 
(because of positive externality, ~ j '  >0); to induce follower i to do that, leader j increases his price 
since strategic complementarity is present, i .e.,  R/ > 0 .  This explains why leader j in this Stackelberg 
"The analysis leading to (5.4), which is an application of the enveIope theorem, is very similar to the proof 
of Proposition 4 in Cooper and John [12]. 
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game would like to increase his price from the Nash equilibrium level. On the other hand, since 
u,' > 0 (the externality is positive), an increase in the price of leader j (with the intention of raising 
his own payoff) will have the effect of benefiting follower i as well. Sequential moves provide a 
better outcome for both players as their prices are set higher than their Nash counterparts. Similar 
argument applies to the game with strategic complementarity and negative externality (such as the 
nominal-wage setting game considered in Lau [26]). In that case, both players of the Stackelberg 
game benefit from the lower level of the strategic variables (as compared to the Nash equilibrium); 
see Table IV. 
5.2. Implications to the equilibrium timing pattern in repeated interaction 
How does the analysis of the effect of the leader's action on the follower's payoff in a 
Stackelberg game relate to the equilibrium timing pattern in repeated interaction? The link lies in the 
interpretation of a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of Stackelberg games with 
symmetric Stackelberg leadership, whereas a synchronized-move dynamic game as a series of short- 
term simultaneous-move games. Since the payoff of the leader in a Stackelberg game is at least as 
high as his payoff in a simultaneous-move game, the effect of the leader's action on the follower is 
crucial to the equilibrium timing pattern. 111 the presence of strategic complementarity, the above 
analysis shows that the follower in a Stackelberg game also gains. Therefore, in a nonsynchronized- 
move dynamic game with strategic compleinentarity, each player has a higher payoff than its Nash 
equilibrium counterpart, both in the first and second periods of a commitment when he is a 'follower' 
and 'leader' re~pect ively .~~ It is, therefore, not surprising that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium 
timing pattern in the presence of strategic complementarity, irrespective of whether positive or 
220n the other hand, the follower will be hurt when strategic substitutability is present. In terms of the 
alternating-move dynamic game, each player will have a higher (again, when compared with the payoff at the 
Nash equilibrium) payoff in one period of the commitment but a lower payoff in another. In general, the 
equilibrium timing pattern in the presence of strategic substitutability is ambiguous and may be sensitive to the 
functional form of the players' payoffs. 
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negative externality is present. 
To summarize, the analysis of this section shows that two factors influencing the benefit or 
disadvantage to the follower in a Stackelberg game are the externality effect and the slope of the 
reaction function. Moreover, by interpreting a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of 
Stackelberg games, the insight in the analysis of the Stackelberg game provides the explanation for 
nonsynchronization in repeated interaction when strategic complementarity exists, which is the main 
focus of this paper. 
6. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSION 
This section provides further discussion and extension. Specifically, Sub-section 6.1 compares 
and contrasts the games with predetermined and fixed actions, Sub-section 6.2 considers the use of 
correlated strategies to solve the coordination problem in the game with predetermined prices, and 
Sub-section 6.3 discusses briefly the equilibrium timing pattern in games with more than two players. 
6. I .  A comparison of tlze games witlz predetermined and $xed prices 
The timing-and-price games with predetermined and fixed prices respectively are analyzed 
in previous sections. While these two games share a lot of similarities in the derivation (in Sections 
3 and 4) as well as the underlying intuition (as explained in Section 5), there are also some interesting 
differences between them. With fixed prices, the intertemporal link is strong. The price set by a 
player at period t will not only affect his payoff at periods t and t + l  (at the equilibrium of 
nonsynchronization, with each player's com~nitment length being two periods) but also the payoffs 
at t+2  and afterwards, through the dynamic reaction functions in (4.4). As a result of this 
intertemporal link, the sequence of prices converges to the steady state level, as shown in (4.8). On 
the other hand, each player's prices alternate between (3.2) and (3.3) during a commitment length of 
two periods in the game with predetermined prices. This lack of intertemporal link in models with 
predetermined actions is observed in both the version without strategic interaction (Fischer [19], 
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Fethke and Policano [17, 181) and the version with strategic interaction used in this paper. 
The difference of predetermined and fixed prices also has implications on the solution of the 
game, especially on the NDFN condition. With predetermined prices, the same static reaction 
function Ri(xj) is used for the current period whether the player commits for one or two periods; see 
(3.7) and (3.9). As a result, the NDFN expression (3.10) only involves the comparison of future 
payoffs. With fixed prices, a player chooses R,(xj) if committing for one period but he chooses 
D,(xj) if committing for two periods. There is a current gain (as Ui (~qxj ) ,x j )  > Ui(~<xj),xj)), but 
c. 
there is greater future loss (given by 0 w'(D<x~)) - fl V in (4.9)) if a player deviates by committing 
L 
for one period. 
An alternative way to look at the above difference is that the NDFN expression (4.9) with 
fixed prices depends on the current price of his opponent, but the NDFN expression (3.10) with 
predetermined prices does not. As a result, the verification of the NDFN condition for the game with 
fixed prices is more difficult than the game with predetermined prices. In particular, while it is 
feasible to verify the NDFN condition analytically for the game with predetermined prices, it is only 
possible to verify the NDFN condition computationally for the game with fixed prices. 
6.2. Correlated equilibrium 
In either Section 3 or Section 4, a inixed strategy equilibrium is considered to solve the 
coordination problem in reaching nonsyilchronization. The mixed strategy equilibrium corresponds 
to the players choosing their strategies independently. Alternatively, if the players are able to 
correlate their strategies, then the idea in Auinann [I] suggests that they may gain higher payoffs. 
Consider the use of correlated strategies to solve the coordination problem in the game with 
predetermined prices (Section 3).13 Suppose the players can engage in preplay discussion and choose 
"A similar correlated equilibrium call be obtained for the game with fixed prices. As the underlying idea 
is similar, only the game with predetermined prices (in which an analytical solution is available) is presented 
SO as to conserve space. 
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their strategies based on the realization of a publicly observable random variable such as a 'coin flip'. 
One simple way to obtain a better outcoine by correlated strategies is that in the beginning of the 
game, player i chooses (l,xN) if heads and (2,xN,x,) if tails, and player j chooses (2,x,,xL) if heads 
and (l,xN) if tails. Each player's intertemporal payoff at the correlated equilibrium is given by: 
where the various components in the middle and right-hand side terms have been defined in Section 
3. While each player's action is still random (as in the mixed strategy equilibrium) at period zero, 
there is a perfect coordination of their choices and nonsynchronization is achieved immediately 
without 'trial and error'. 
As the value of the game corresponding to the correlated equilibrium differs from V in (3.16), 
it is necessary to check whether the NDFN condition in this case still holds or not. Combining (3.4), 
(3.8), (3.10) and (6. I),  it can be shown that 
Therefore, the players would not deviate from nonsynchronization even when they are able to 
correlate their strategies. At this correlated equilibrium, nonsynchronization is reached starting from 
period one and then perpetuates forever. 
While correlated strategies inay solve the coordination problem and give the players higher 
payoffs by reaching i~oi~syi~cl~roi~iza t io i~  fas er (in an expected sense), one may question that if preplay 
communication is possible, why would they not further consider sustaining an even better outcome 
(such as the cooperative outcome) by inore sophisticated mechanisms. This is possible when the 
discount factor is close to one for the usual 'Folk Theorem' reasons. Comparatively, the concept of 
mixed strategy equilibriuill used in earlier sections is closer in spirit to the focus of this paper, which 
examines the roles of different timing patterns (rather than other possible mechanisms) in solving the 
strategic conflicts of the players. 
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6.3. Equilibrium timing yutter-n in games witlz more than two players: Some preliminary thoughts 
This paper considers games with two players and shows that nonsynchronization is the 
equilibrium timing pattern in the presence of strategic complementarity, whether the players choose 
predetermined or fixed actions. It would be helpful to see whether the above results can be extended 
to games with more interacting players. 
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, Lau [26] and this paper can be regarded as two 
relating steps to address the question of equilibrium pattern under time-dependent adjustment rules. 
Specifically, Lau [26] considers, in a two-player game with fixed actions, the relative ability of 
synchronization and nonsynchronization in overcoming macroeconomic externality of wage 
adjustment. That game is simpler to analyze since the commitment length is restricted to be two 
periods and therefore, the choice of each player, when he moves, is only one-dimensional. Building 
on some of the results of that paper, this paper further considers whether the Pareto superior timing 
pattern will arise as the equilibrium outcome by allowing the players to choose both the commitment 
length and the strategic variable. It is found that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium timing pattern 
when strategic complementarity is present. 
Applyiilg the above two-step approach to a game with more than two players, it is easier to 
first consider whether synchronization or nonsynchronization is the Pareto superior timing pattern, 
before examining the equilibrium pattern. In the two-player game considered in Lau [26], the 
strategic benefit of staggered wage adjustment lies in its ability in overcoming the externalities in 
decentralized wage setting. When the number of wage setters increases, the effect of a change in the 
wage of each sector on the aggregate price level becomes smaller and smaller. (In examining whether 
the results of their earlier paper are robust with respect to the number of sectors, Fethke and Policano 
[18, pp. 871-8721 nlention a similar point: "If the economy consists of a larger number of small 
sectors, . . . the effect on the aggregate price level of the actions by any one sector is negligible.") 
As a result, the externality problem becomes lllore severe. It is logical to conjecture that the benefit 
of a nonsynchronized timing pattern in overcoming macroeconomic externalities becomes more 
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important when the number of wage setters increases. In fact, some preliminary results, based on 
computational methods, suggest that the conclusion of Pareto superior nonsynchronized wage 
adjustment for (the deterministic version of) the game in Lau [26] can be extended to a game with 
three players. 
To summarize, two results may be useful to the question about the equilibrium timing pattern 
in games with more than two players. First, it is found that nonsynchronization is the Pareto superior 
timing pattern for a game with three players when strategic complementarity is present. Second, it 
is found that with two players, the preferred timing pattern of nonsynchronization (in a simpler game) 
will arise as the equilibrium timing pattern (of a more complicated game) in the presence of strategic 
complelnentarity. Based on these two points, it seems likely that with three or more players, the 
Pareto superior pattern of ~ ~ o n s y ~ ~ c l ~ r o n i z a t i o ~ ~  will arise as the equilibrium timing pattern of a game 
allowing for two-dimensional choices of both the commitment length and the strategic variable. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper aiins to explain an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent 
adjustment rules in a number of lnacroeconomic models. Arguing that the presence of 
interdependence among economic agents is a necessary ingredient for the issue of aggregate timing 
pattern to be relevant and interesting, this paper seeks a game-theoretic explanation of 
nonsynchronization by pursuing the idea in Maskin and Tirole [27, 28, 291 that the nature of a game 
may differ with respect to the timing pattern. This paper derives explicitly the equilibrium timing 
pattern in a model with strategic complementarity and positive externality when the pl'ayers interact 
strategically by choosing either predetermined prices (in Section 3) or fixed prices (in Section 4)." 
reason for the success in obtaining the aggregate timing pattern endogenously is the tractability 
provided by the use of a two-player model, which is quite consistent with this paper's emphasis on strategic 
interaction. Obviously, whether small or large nulllber of agents is assumed in a model depends on the purpose 
of the analysis. For example, problenls associated with information imperfection are likely to be more serious 
in an economy with a large number of agents. In examining whether information extraction is an important 
factor determining the aggregate tinling patlern, it is more reasonable to use a specification with a large number 
of agents, as done in Ball and Ceccl~etti 121. In general, the specification of a large number (approaching 
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These results coiltribute to the literature of the microfoundations of staggered adjustment rules.25 
In particular, this paper provides a game-theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization for both 
predetermined and fixed actions, whereas in previous microfoundation works emphasizing other 
explanations, Fethke and Policano [17, 181 focus on predetermined (wage) adjustment only, and Ball 
and Cecchetti [2] and Ball and Roiner [4] focus on fixed (price) adjustment only. Moreover, it shows 
that the slope of the reaction functiolls and the sign of the externality effect are two important factors 
in determining the outcome of time-dependent adjustment rules. When the agents interact strategically 
and dynamically, nonsynchroilizatioil is the equilibrium timing pattern in the presence of strategic 
complementarity. On the other hand, the sign of the externality effect determines whether the 
players' strategic variables are higher or lower under nonsynchronization. In the presence of strategic 
complementarity and positive (resp. negative) externality, the players moving alternatingly benefit 
from the higher (resp. lower) level of the strategic variables. 
In deriving the various results, this paper enriches the applicability of the framework used in 
Fudenberg and Tirole [20] and Bulow et al. [lo]. The slope of the reaction function and the sign of 
the externality effect have been fouild to be important in the analysis of business strategies (Fudenberg 
and Tirole [20]), multiproduct oligopoly (Bulow et al. [lo]), the relative payoffs of the Stackelberg 
leader and follower (Gal-Or [21]), macroeconomic coordination failures (Cooper and John [12]) and 
adjustment cost games (Lapham and Ware [25]). More examples can be found in Fudenberg and 
Tirole [20], Bulow et al. [lo], and Milgronl and Roberts 1301. The results of this paper add to the 
above lists the effect on the aggregate pattern of time-dependent adjustment rules in repeated 
infinity) of agents and that of a small number of agents (two for models with strategic interaction) can be 
regarded as two extreme but convenieilt simplifying assumptions which make the analysis tractable. 
"Maskin and Tirole [28, pp. 565-566; 29, pp. 590-5911 discuss briefly a model with fixed actions in which 
nonsynchronized moves are derived (rather than imposed) by allowing each player to have a choice of being 
out of market for a period so as to move from one cohort to another. Besides making a different (and perhaps 
more realistic) specification of allowing the players to comnlit for either one or two periods (rather than to wait 
for a period and obtain no current payoff), Section 4 of this paper provides a more detailed analysis of how 
nonsynchronization arises e~ldogeilously as a result of the players choosing mixed strategies at the beginning of 
the game. 
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interaction. 
Finally, this paper reveals a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronized 
decision dates. In Taylor [32] and Blanchard [6], nonsynchronized adjustment is suggested as an 
important ingredient in the explanation of persistent real effect of nominal shocks, which is a crucial 
feature of non-Walrasian explanations of ecoilomic fluctuations. This paper further explains, in a 
game theoretic framework, nonsynchronization in terms of a property of the agents' objective 
functions: strategic complementarity. An important paper by Cooper and John [12] shows that 
strategic complementarity is crucial for the presence of two other important macroeconomic 
phenomena: n~ultiple equilibria and multiplier effects. It appears that strategic complementarity is an 
important element in non-Walrasian explanations of business cycles. Further studies on the 
importance of strategic coinplemeiltarity in other issues related to economic fluctuations, such as 
whether strategic complementarity is a determinant of nominal rigidity in state-dependent adjustment 
rules, would also be useful to enhance our understanding. 
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Table I: Strategies and payoffs at the beginning of the game with predetermined prices 
Table 11: Strategies and payoffs at the beginning of the game with fixed prices 
Table 111: Selected calculatioils of the no-deviation-from-nonsynchronization expression 
@\bJ I 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Notes: 
(a) Each entry represents the magnitude of (4.17) divided by h2 
(b) As each of V ,  , V, , U , ,  , U2? and U,, is a product of h2 and a term involving only on 
parameters p and g ,  it is easy to observe from (4.14) that p depends only on P and g. 
Consequently, each of V in (4.15) and NDFN(xN) in (4.17) is also a product of h2 and a term 
depending only on P and g . 
STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY AND ENDOGENOUS NONSYNCHRONIZATION 35 
Table IV: Factors determiili~lg the benefit or disadvantage to the Stackelberg follower 
Notes: 
(a) The terminology (of the Stackelberg leader j) inside the quotation marks follows Fudenberg 
and Tirole [20]. 
Negative externality 
( q i < o ,  u / < o )  
5' 
r I 
Xi& Ui f  
I 
uj r 






Case 3: 'Top Dog' 
Strategic Comple~nentarity 
(u ;>  0) 
Strategic Substitutability 
(u ;<o)  
(b) The payoff of follower i is higher (than the Nash payoff) in Case 1 or 2, but is lower in Case 
3 or 4.  
Positive externality 
(U,i>0; Ui'>O) 
xj f  
(u;) r I (u;) 
xi f  Ui f  
I (Ui') 
uj r 






Case 4: 'Lean and Hungry' 
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